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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL J. MIDDLESTADT 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OR REVIEW of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah; 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY; 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY; 
COMTROL, INC.; WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH; and 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-16 of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Do the filing limitations requiring a claimant to apply 
for permanent partial disability payments within eight years after 
the date of his injury as found in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 35-
1-66 of the Worker's Compensation Act violate the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and 35-1-66 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act requiring workers to file claims for benefits 
within eight years from the date of their injury violate the equal 
protection clause of the Utah Constitution? 
Priority No. 7 
Case No. 920237-CA 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since this action involves a final appealable administrative 
order from the Industrial Commission (Commission), the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter referred to as "UAPA") 
applies and vests in this court the authority to grant relief when 
the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law. . 
. ." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (4) (d) (1989). See also Avis v. 
Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah App. 1992). UAPA also 
allows this court to extend relief to a petitioner where "the 
statute or rule on which the agency action is based is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-16 (4) (a) (1989). 
In reviewing the application or interpretation of a law a 
correction of error standard applies and this court is entitled to 
give no difference to the Commission's interpretation of the law 
involved. Avis, 837 P.2d at 586. See also Anderson v. Public 
Service Commission, 190 Ut. Adv. Rpt. 24, 25 (Utah 1992) (citing 
Savage Industries v. State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 
(Utah 1991)). 
Under UAPA, the Commission in granted discretion in applying 
the law to the facts only when "there is a grant of discretion to 
the agency concerning the language in question, either expressly 
made in the statute or implied from the statutory language." Avis, 
837 P.2d at 586. 
Finally, since the Commission is not a court possessing 
general jurisdiction, it did not have the authority to address the 
constitutionality of the statutes challenged herein. Id. See also 
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civil cause to which he is a party 
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period of eight years from the date of the 
injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-66 
Partial disability-scale of payments....-
The commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to any 
employee. His physical condition results from 
such injuries not finally healed and fixed 
eight years after the date of injury and he 
files an application for such purpose prior to 
the expiration of such eight year period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case; 
Mr. Middlestadt is appealing an order of the Industrial 
Commission which is dated March 12, 1992. This order denied Mr. 
Middlestadt's motion for review of an order of partial dismissal1 
issued by the Administrative Law Judge on November 21, 1991. R.54-
57. 
B. Course of Proceedings; 
On May 21, 1991, Mr. Middlestadt filed an application for a 
hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah seeking, among 
other things, temporary total disability and permanent partial 
disability benefits. R. 11. 
On November 10, 1991 the attorneys representing the various 
parties, including Mountain Fuel Supply, (hereinafter referred to 
as "Mountain Fuel") met in a conference and discussed the merits of 
Mr. Middlestadt's application. As a result of that meeting the 
Administrative Law Judge determined that there was no justiciable 
1
 on going causally related medical expenses to continue. 
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statutes and the time limitations found therein are 
unconstitutional. Mountain Fuel does not bear the burden of 
showing that the statutes are constitutional and this court is 
entitled to apply what is otherwise been characterized as an 
intermediate level of scrutiny in its review of the 
constitutionality of the statutes in question. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are not statutes of 
repose as Mr. Middlestadt argues in his brief. Instead, they are 
statutes of limitation or benefit limitations because they limit 
the period of time in which an injured worker may seek compensation 
and that limit of time is based on the occurrence of the injury or 
accident. On the other hand, a statute of repose basis its 
computation of time on some event unrelated to the accident or 
injury sustained by the individual. Mr. Middlestadt has claimed 
that the event as to which the applicable limitation or time period 
must run are his surgeries which occurred in 1987 and 1990. 
However, these surgeries are admitted to have resulted from the 
original injuries sustained by the Mr. Middlestadt in 1976 and 
1980. A plain reading of the statute shows that the time period 
runs from the date of the accident and injury and petitioner's 
arguments that the surgeries are the event for calculating the time 
are without merit. 
Petitioner also cannot show the existence of any special 
circumstances which would render him eligible for the equitable 
exceptions to the statute of limitations. Those exceptions require 
a showing that either the individual had no way of knowing that 
6 
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concerns of allowing the Industrial Commission to evaluate the 
merits of any petition or request for benefits by having evidence 
that is fresh, discoverable and reviewable, and not so distant in 
time as to be rendered unreliable. 
Finally, this court, in Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1992) upheld the very statute applicable to Mountain 
Fuel's case. Mountain Fuel is a party to this action as a result 
of a injury sustained by Mr. Middlestadt in 1976. In 1976, the 
applicable limitation period was set forth in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
99 and that statute has been held by the Avis court to be 
constitutional and not in violation of the open court or equal 
protection clauses of the Utah constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED S35-1-65 AND S35-1--66 
ARE CLEARLY STATUTES OF LIMITATION, 
AND NOT STATUTES OF REPOSE 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 2 are not statutes of 
repose as Mr. Middlestadt argues in his brief but instead are 
statutes of limitations which affix an outside time limit and 
require claimants to file within that time period in order to be 
2
 Mountain Fuel Supply is a party to this lawsuit as a result 
of injuries sustained by the plaintiff in 1976. In 1976 the 
applicable time limitation period was found in Utah Code Annotated 
section 35-1-99. This section was repealed in 1988 and replaced by 
a similar section found at Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-98 (2). It 
is Mountain Fuel's position that insofar as it is concerned, 
section 35-1-99 is the only applicable provision. However, for the 
sake of consistency and uniformity, Mountain Fuel will address the 
issues as stated by petitioner and/or refer to sections 35-1-65 and 
35-1-66 in the body of its argument. 
8 
eligible for benefits. 3 
Statutes of limitations prohibit suits which are filed after 
a statutorily specific period of time following the accrual of a 
cause of action. Avis, 837 P.2d at 587. Statutes of Repose, on 
the other hand, prohibit suits a certain number of years after a 
specific event occurs and that event is unrelated to or occurs 
without regard to when a petitioner's cause of action accrues. Id. 
In other words, a statute of repose can serve to bar a cause of 
action even where an individual's cause of action has not accrued. 
The most common statutes of repose were often enacted in the 
products liability context where the event affixing the time period 
was the date the product was manufactured. The time would count 
from the date the product was manufactured and at the end of the 
statutory period, that product no longer posed any liability risk 
to the manufacturer. 
Such a result occurred in the case of Berry v« Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). In Berry the plaintiff was killed 
in an airplane accident and attempted to sue the manufacturer of 
the airplane on a products liability theory. However, a statute of 
repose was in effect which precluded suit a certain period of time 
after the manufacture of the airplane and regardless of when a 
party was injured by the product. In Berry, and subsequent cases 
dealing with various statutes of repose, the Utah Supreme Court has 
declared such statutes unconstitutional because they completely bar 
3
 The Worker's Compensation Fund has referred to the time 
limits as benefit limitations. Either way the operable events that 
start the limitation running are the accident and injury date. 
9 
an individual's right to sue regardless of when that individuals 
cause of action accrues. 4 
The language in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 shows that they are 
statute of limitations because they run "from the date of injury, 
when the cause of action accrues, not from a point in time 
unrelated to when the cause of action arose." Avis, 837 P.2d at 
587. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 states in pertinent part: 
In no case shall such compensation 
benefits exceed three hundred and twelve weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of injury. 
Section 35-1-66 prior to the 1988 amendment which does not 
apply in this case, stated that: 
The commission may make a permanent 
partial disability award at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of injury to any 
employee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of injury and 
who files an application for such purpose 
prior to the expiration of such eight year 
period. 
Clearly the language of both statutes link the time limitation 
period to the accrual of the cause of action or in other words, the 
date in which in an individual was injured. Hence, section 35-1-65 
4
 Statutes of Repose have met with increasing disfavor in 
Utah. See, Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 
243 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 
1087 (Utah, 1989); Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herat 
Hughes & Sons, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah, 1989). To Mountain Fuel's 
knowledge, only one statute of repose presently exists in Utah law. 
That statute of repose is the medical malpractice limitation found 
at Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1992). 
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cuts off an individuals right to compensation "eight years from the 
date of the injury." Id. Section 35-1-66 similarly allows for 
permanent partial disability awards "at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury." Id. It further requires 
application for permanent partial disability awards within that 
eight year period. Id. 
Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are not 
statutes of repose and the analysis found in "the Berry line of 
cases is not directly applicable . . . . " Avis, 837 P.2d at 587. 
POINT II 
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
SOUND BECAUSE THEY SET FORTH A LIMITED BUT 
REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO FILE FOR BENEFITS. 
As previously noted, "[s]tate legislatures possess the 
discretion to enact statutes of limitation, and these statutes are 
presumptively constitutional." Id. Furthermore, "[a] statute of 
limitation is constitutionally sound if it should allow a 
reasonable, not unlimited, time in which to bring suit." Id. 
(citing McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D. 
Utah 1989). It is with the ambit and domain of the legislature to 
determine what constitutes a reasonable time and such a 
determination is left to "the judgment of the legislature, and the 
courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing a period of 
legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient 
that the statute becomes a denial of justice." Avis, 837 P.2d at 
587, (citations omitted). 
There are exceptions which are designed to alleviate the 
11 
sometimes harsh application of statutes of limitation. These 
exceptions "involve cases where plaintiff[s] had no way of knowing 
the injury had occurred until after the statute had run and 
therefore no way of affixing or exploring potential liability 
within the statutory period." Id. at 587. However, Mr. 
Middlestadt has failed to argue any of the above mentioned 
exceptions. Instead, Mr. Middlestadt has chosen to argue that the 
statutes are actually statutes of repose and therefore attacks the 
same under the open courts and equal protection provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. As previously mentioned, the open courts 
analysis and two prong test as found in the Berry line of cases, is 
not directly applicable to statutes of limitation. Therefore since 
Mr. Middlestadt has failed to argue or set forth any circumstances 
which would make him eligible for any of the exceptions to statutes 
of limitation his claims of constitutional violation are without 
merit and should be summarily dismissed. 
POINT III 
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 ARE NOT 
VIOLATIVE OF THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Assuming arguendo that this court rejects Mountain Fuel's 
position that §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 are statutes of limitation, and 
hold that they are statutes of repose, the statutes nevertheless 
pass the two prong test as outlined in the case Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, otherwise 
known as the "open courts" provision, provides that "[a]11 courts 
12 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him and 
person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course 
of law . . . ." In the Berry case, the Utah Supreme Court in 
striking down the products liability statute of repose under the 
open courts provision, outlined a two prong test "which 
contemplates both the individual rights constitutionally protected 
by the open courts provision and the legislative interest in 
promoting the social and economic welfare." Velarde, 831 P.2d at 
127. 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course 
of law" for vindication of his constitutional 
interest. The benefit provided by the 
substitute must be substantially equal in 
value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated 
in providing essentially comparable 
substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different . . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy or cause of action may be justified 
only if there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary 
or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Id. (citing Berry, 717 P.2d at 680) (emphasis added). Statutes 
survive the Berry analysis if either one of the two prongs of the 
test is met. 
POINT A 
MR. MIDDLESTADT HAD AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY UNDER §35-1-65 
AND §35-1-66 HAD HE FILED A TIMELY CLAIM FOR 
COMPENSATION WITH THE COMMISSION. 
In the case of Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
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1987), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a constitutional attack 
based on the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. The 
claims made by the plaintiffs in Jackson also are similar in nature 
to the present claim of Mr. Middlestadt. Mr. Middlestadt's brief 
is essentially arguing that no statute of limitation should apply 
to his claim and that he should be granted an open ended 
opportunity to pursue his remedy under the workmen's compensation 
statutes. However, nothing in law or equity requires that 
individuals be given an unlimited period of time following an 
accident or injury in which they can pursue their claims. 
In the Jackson case, one of the plaintiffs sustained injuries 
in February of 1979 while sliding on a hill that was constructed 
and maintained by Layton City. This hill was constructed in 
November 1974. Plaintiffs filed their claim against Layton City on 
August 14, 1983, a date approximately 4 1/2 years after the 
accident and close to nine years after the date the sledding hill 
was constructed. The trial court held that plaintiffs claim was 
barred by the four year general statute of limitations applicable 
to personal injuries caused by negligent conduct. On appeal, the 
plaintiffs argued that the seven year statute of limitation found 
that Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5 was the applicable statute 
of limitations instead of the four year period for filing personal 
injury actions as found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (2). Section 
78-12-25.5 serves to limit a time in which a suit can be filed 
based on a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property to seven years from the date of the construction of that 
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condition or improvement. 
Plaintiffs attacked this statute under the open courts 
provision claiming that the statute eliminated their cause of 
action even before it actually accrued simply because the hill was 
constructed nine years prior to their injuries and hence beyond the 
seven year statute. The Utah Supreme Court disposed of plaintiffs 
constitutional attacks based on the first prong of the Berry 
analysis which requires that a plaintiff be given a reasonable 
alternative remedy. The Jackson court held that the plaintiff "had 
an effective remedy against Layton City as owner in possession of 
the property that could have been filed within four years from the 
date of the injury. They cannot invoke Berry to excuse them from 
their own dilatory conduct." Id. at Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1199. 
Mr. Middlestadt's position is strikingly similar to those 
arguments made in the Jackson and Avis cases. The facts are 
undisputed that Mr. Middlestadt was aware of his injuries in 1976 
and in 1980 as evidenced by the fact that he received worker's 
compensation benefits for both injuries. Unfortunately, just as in 
the Jackson and Avis cases, Mr. Middlestadt had an alternative 
remedy but failed to file his claim with the Commission within 
eight years from the date of his injuries. It is important to note 
that the eight year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 affords Mr. Middlestadt twice the amount 
of time to pursue his claims as he would have had had he otherwise 
been subject to the four year statute of limitations applicable to 
personal injury claims. See Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25. (1982). Mr. 
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Middlestadt clearly had an effective alternative remedy under the 
act but his failure to timely pursue that remedy deprives him of 
the right to proceed. 
Mr. Middlestadt relies heavily on the case Wrolstad v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 786 P.2d 243 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) in 
asserting his open courts claim. However, Wrolstad is 
significantly different and easily distinguishable from Mr. 
Middlestadt's situation. In Wrolstad, the plaintiff developed 
asbestosis some ten years after leaving his employment as an 
electrician. Mr. Wrolstad's claims fell under the state 
Occupational Disease, Disability Compensation Act and that act had 
a statute of repose which required Mr. Wrolstad to file within one 
year after the termination of his employment in order to be 
eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. This particular 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §35-2-13(a)(2), was clearly a statute of 
repose because the claim was barred before it arose. The Utah 
Court of Appeals found that it violated the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution. 
However, the statutory provision at issue in Wrolstad is 
completely different from the statutes at issue here. From 1976 
on, Mr. Middlestadt was aware that he had suffered an industrial 
accident and was further aware of his ongoing injuries and the 
possible long term effects from those accidents. Just as the 
petitioner in the Avis case was aware of his injuries, so to has 
Mr. Middlestadt been aware of his condition "over a period of 
several years." Avis, 837 P.2d at 588. It follows that Mr. 
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Middlestadt could have filed for the compensation he now seeks 
within the statutory period, which began running on the date of his 
injury and not the date he terminated his employment as in the 
Wrolstad case. Id. What Mr. Middlestadt is seeking is just what 
Mr. Avis sought in the Avis case. Mr. Middlestadt "seeks a rule 
which would postpone running of the statute until he 'discovered' 
the full extent of his injury. The workman's compensation statute, 
however, does not require stabilization before filing for 
benefits." Id. In short no matter what remedy Mr. Middlestadt had 
or chose to pursue, he would still be subject to a statute of 
limitations. Id. "His alternative remedy was to timely file." 
Id. 
Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 clearly allow Mr. Middlestadt to 
seek compensation prior to the stabilization of his injuries and 
any intimation on the part of Mr. Middlestadt that the surgeries on 
his back, which were admittedly secondary to the injuries sustained 
in 1976 and in 1980, are new injuries warranting new benefits is 
clearly in error. If anything, the surgeries were designed to 
stabilize and finally fix the extent of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries 
in 1976 and 1980. 
It is also important to note that the workman's compensation 
act itself has been held to be a constitutionally valid statutory 
scheme and offers a reasonable and constitutionally sound 
alternative remedy. Masich v. U.S. Smelting and Ref. and Min. Co., 
191 P.2d 612, (Utah 1948) (appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866). 
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POINT B 
SECTIONS 35-1-65 AND 35-1-66 SERVE A CLEAR 
LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVE AND ARE REASONABLE AND CONCISE 
IN ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE 
In applying the second prong of the Berry analysis it is 
helpful to first contrast Mr. Middlestadt's claims with the claims 
made in the Wrolstad case. In Wrolstad this court invalidated 
section 35-2-13(a)(2), which set forth a one year repose period for 
non-silicosis occupational disease claims resulting in total 
disability. The Wrolstad court barely touched the second prong of 
the Berry analysis and clearly felt comfortable in saying that "we 
see no reasonable public policy justification for thus precluding 
[the plaintiff's] right to recovery for occupational disease." 
Wrolstad, 786 P.2d at 245. 
In contrast, the limitation period found in §35-1-65 and §35-
1-66 clearly represent an attempt on the part of the legislature to 
establish a ceiling on the filing issue. The statutes of 
limitation promote the public policy concerns of protecting 
employers and the State of Utah Second Injury Fund (now called The 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund) from responding or attempting to 
evaluate claims which have occurred in the distant past and which 
have aged to the point that "evidence has been lostr memories have 
faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Avis, 837 P.2d at 587, 
(citing Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 81)). 
Another presumption underlying the public policy concerns in 
these two statutes is that the applicant seeking compensation would 
act reasonably under the circumstances as well. The legislature 
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has clearly manifested a concern that causation both medical and 
legal have a reasonable basis for determination. The Legislature 
has shown that concern by enacting a statute of limitation. Such 
a piece of legislation evidences a strong legislative purpose and 
meticulous efforts to achieve that purpose. For similar reasons, 
so does the four year alternative statute of limitation for other 
non-worker's compensation personal injury claims under Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25(3) which has specifically been found to be 
constitutional in the case of McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital, 724 
F.Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
In analyzing the Worker's Compensation Act and the benefit 
limitations contained in §35-1-65 and §35-1-66, it must be 
remembered that the Act in total is the substitute remedy for tort 
claims between employee and employer. The principle of fault was 
abolished and specific, though limited, benefits were granted. The 
Appellant has presented no arguments that would support his 
position that the substituted benefits are not reasonable under all 
circumstances associated with industrial accidents. 
In summary, §35-1-65 and §35-1-66 clearly do not offend the 
second prong of the Berry analysis and are designed and drafted to 
promote the strong public policy concerns outlined above. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-65 AND §35-1-66 
ARE NON-VTOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Middlestadt's brief briefly argues that §35-1-65 and §35-
1-66 are unconstitutional based on unequal protection grounds. 
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However, his brief is void of any substantive analysis or argument 
and he sets forth very little precedent or public policy argument 
to support his claims therein. 
Article 1 section 24 of the Utah constitution which is 
essentially Utah's counter-part to the Federal Equal Protection 
Clauser requires that "all laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform application." 
Just as the Utah Supreme Court has developed a two pronged 
analysis for the open courts provision test, so too has the court 
developed a two part test to determine whether statutes are in 
violation the equal protection provision of Utah constitution. The 
first prong requires that the law must apply equally to all persons 
within a class. The second prong requires that any statutory 
classification which gives different treatment based on that 
classification must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989) (citing Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
In Condemarin, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the 
appropriate standard of review for applying an eqrual protection 
analysis requires a determination of whether or not the right 
protected in the constitution provision is fundamental. Id. at 
358. Any activity which infringes on a fundamental right will be 
subject to strict scrutiny while activities which threaten non-
fundamental rights will be subject only to a rational basis review. 
The Condemarin Court clearly recognized that the rights protected 
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by the open court provision are non fundamental insofar as the 
equal protection clause is concerned. Id. at 359. For this 
reason, this court need only determine whether the statutes 
challenged by Mr. Middlestadt and their inherent classifications 
are rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at 
356. 
Mr. Middlestadt's claims, as outlined in his brief appear to 
imply that any statutes of limitations which apply in the workmen's 
compensation context are unconstitutional as they modify common law 
rights. As previously mentioned however, the Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly upheld the workmen's compensation statute as 
constitutional. Masich, 191 P.2d at 612. However, the statutes of 
limitation found in Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 clearly apply 
equally to all persons in the class, that class being individuals 
who are injured on the job and covered by workmen's compensation. 
Again, as with the open courts provision challenge, the statute of 
limitations are presumed valid and Mr. Middlestadt has failed in 
any meaningful way to overcome this presumption. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Berry analysis and its two prong test is applied to 
sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66, it becomes clear that the statute of 
limitations outlined therein, are not in violation of either the 
open courts provision of the Utah constitution or the equal 
protection provisions of the same. Mr. Middlestadt had an 
alternative remedy under act and these statutes of limitation serve 
the clear legislative purpose of limiting the time in which claims 
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may be brought. After Appellant filed this writ, this Court has 
determined in the case of Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 
(Utah App. 1992), that the statute of limitations in the Worker's 
Compensation Act were constitutional. This Court should therefore 
deny Appellant's request and affirm the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. In short, these statutes are clearly constitutional and the 
Industrial Commission was proper in denying Mr, Middlestadt's 
claims. Therefore respondent Mountain Fuel Supply respectfully 
requests this court affiann the Industrial Commission's decision 
denying Mr. Middlestadt additional benefits. 
DATED this jcf day of December, 1992. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E. KAtiELL 
DANIEL L. STEELE 
Attorneys for Mountain Fuel and 
Continental Casualty 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11 
2. Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 24 
3. Order of Dismissal 
4. Order Denying Motion for Review 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
35-1-65. Temporary disability—Amount of payments—State average 
weekly wage defined.—(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 66%% of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury 
so long as such disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 100% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and 
$5 for each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to 
a maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the 
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. Tn no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury over a period of eight years from the date- of the injury. 
(2) • • • [Same as parent volume]. 
35-1-66. Partial disability—Scale of payments.—Where the injury 
causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such 
disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight 
years from the date of the injury, compensation equal to 66 2/3% of the 
difference between tbat employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, 
but not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week and in addition thereto $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week. 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability award at 
any time prior to eight years after the date of injury to any employee 
whose physical condition resulting from such injury is not finally healed 
and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application 
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In case the partial disability begins after a period of total disability, 
the period of total disability shall be deducted from the total period of 
compensation. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, 
or the death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 2/3% 
of that employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but 
not more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per 
week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent 
minor children, but not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number 
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition 
to the compensation hereinbefore provided for temporary total disability, 
to wit: 
(A) to (C) • • • [Same as parent volume.] 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and 
paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing99 is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in 
decibels with frequencies of 500, 1000 and 2000 cycles per second (cps) 
using pure tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1951) ap-
proved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of 
hearing impairment Seduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 
2000 cycles per second shall not be considered in determining compensable 
disability. 
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PAUL J MIDDLESTADT, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
VS. * ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY * 
and/or CONTINENTAL * 
CASUALTY; COMTROL and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION * 
FUND; and EMPLOYERS * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter having been duly considered, and it 
having been determined that: 
1. Respond to request for documentation. 
2. Provide medical records. 
3. Cooperate in investigating the case.. 
4. Actively prosecute this matter. 
xx 5. Other: There is no justiciable issue at this time. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant 
be, and the same is hereby, dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or specific 
written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission within 
thirty (30) days from date of this Order, or it shall be the final 
Order of the Commission, not sjubject to furbheg^ jreview or appeal. 
Certified this 21st day of 
November 1991. 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Patricia Ashby 
(Lrn^ 
len 
Law Judge 
Patricia Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
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CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, COMTROL, 
INC., and/or WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, and EMPLOYERS' 
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ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant which was received on December 17, 1991 in the 
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
On April 2, 1985, the administrative law judge (ALJ) entered 
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the 
applicant benefits which arose from industrial accidents which 
occurred on August 16, 1976, and December 5, 1980. Subsequent to 
the 1985 order, the applicant had two surgeries on his back for 
which he seeks additional workers' compensation benefits. 
Applicant claims that at the request of defendants' counsel, 
an attorneys' conference was held on November 19, 1991. He also 
claims that after the defendants' counsel had briefly outlined the 
present claim to the ALJ, the ALJ stated that applicant had no 
further claim to benefits based upon the dates of the industrial 
accidents, but that the defendants must pay the applicant's medical 
expenses pursuant to the April 2, 1985 order. On November 21, 
1991, the ALJ entered an Order of Dismissal which stated that there 
was no justiciable issue at that time. 
Applicant alleges that he cannot respond to the order since no 
motion was made by defendants, and since the ALJ failed to state 
the basis for the order. However, applicant states that he 
understands that the ALJ's statement at the hearing indicated that 
defendants must pay the medical expenses related to his industrial 
accident. Defendant Workers Compensation Fund does not dispute its 
responsibility for payment of these medical expenses. The 
disconnect arises as to whether the defendants are obligated to pay 
for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) and permanent 
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ORDER 
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The United Parcel case is inapplicable since the tolling 
provision relied upon in United Parcel became effective after the 
date of Mr. Middlestadt's injuries. Id. at 141. In the instant 
case, the provisions of Section 35-1-99 which apply to Mr. 
Middlestadt mention no tolling provision, and further, defendant 
Workers Compensation Fund is correct when it states that neither 
United Parcel nor Section 35-1-99 apply in Mr. Middlestadt's case. 
The statutes of limitation in Section 35-1-99 do not apply, 
and the relevant statutes of limitation are contained in Sections 
35-1-65 and 66 which have been discussed previously. 
Although the ALJ's order could have elaborated more on his 
reasons for dismissing applicant's claim, and the finding of no 
justiciable issue to be litigated, we believe that the application, 
the answer, and the order provide sufficient information on which 
to base a dismissal. The application was dated on May 20, 1991, 
and was apparently filed on that date or later. Applicant claimed 
two injuries, one on August 16, 1976, and the other on December 5, 
1980. Both of these dates are well beyond eight years from the 
date of filing of the application. 
Defendant Workers Compensation Fund's answer to the 
application clearly states at Paragraph Numbers Three and Five that 
any compensation based on the dates of injury alleged by applicant 
would be wholly barred by statutes of limitation. 
Finally, applicant states that the Utah Constitution 
guarantees him a legal remedy for an injury done to his person. He 
cites Wrolstad v. Ind. Comm'n. 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App. 1990) for 
this proposition. The factual situation in the instant case is 
completely different. The applicant's injuries occurred, claims 
were filed, an order was entered, benefits were paid, and medical 
expenses related to the industrial injury will continue to be taken 
care of. In Wrolstad, the filing requirement based on Mr. 
Wrolstad#s disease expired prior to the cause of action arising. 
This occurred in Mr. Wrolstad's case because of the extended 
latency period of his disease. Since the Sections 35-1-65 and 66 
are not bridled with the constitutional infirmity of Wrolstad. we 
must uphold these statutes of limitation. 
For all the previously stated reasons, we therefore hold that 
the ALJ's decision when viewed in the perspective of the entire 
record is substantially supported by the evidence. 
